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Abstract
Mismeasurement of productivity is one possible explanation for the 
global productivity slowdown in recent decades. This article discusses 
the challenges of measuring productivity in the digital age. The 
article covers some background about the productivity slowdown 
and about productivity measurement, the pressure that the growth 
in the digital economy is putting on productivity measurement, 
some estimates of mismeasurement from other countries, and the 
implications for New Zealand. The main conclusion is that, despite 
measurement issues, the productivity slowdown in New Zealand 
and elsewhere cannot simply be written off as measurement error. 
A further conclusion is that the digital economy has many benefits 
that fall outside conventional productivity measurement.
Keywords productivity slowdown, productivity mismeasurement, 
digital economy, digital technologies
Robert Solow once famously quipped that ‘you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity 
statistics’ (Solow, 1987). This comment 
seems as relevant – if not more so – today 
as when it was made 30 years ago. We 
experience the value from new digital 
technologies every day at work and in our 
leisure. Yet, at the same time, recent global 
productivity growth has been sluggish. 
Productivity growth has been slowing 
worldwide
Since the mid-2000s, productivity growth 
has been declining in many countries. This 
decline has been substantial, long-lasting 
and across the board (van Ark, 2016). 
Globally, labour productivity growth 
(measured as output per worker) has 
only moderately slowed from 2.6% per 
year, on average, in the 1996–2006 period 
to 2.4% in the 2007–14 period (ibid.). 
The slowdown in global multifactor 
productivity growth has been much more 
dramatic, declining from 1.3% per year 
in the 1996-2006 period to only 0.3% 
in the 2007-14 period. New Zealand has 
seen this productivity slowdown too, but 
the slowdown here predated that in many 
other countries and was less severe.
A number of explanations have been 
given for the global productivity slowdown, 
many of which relate to technology. Some 
argue that today’s technological innovations 
may not be as transformational as those in 
the past (Gordon, 2016, cited in Manyika 
et al., 2017). Conversely, others argue that 
the gains from technology are yet to 
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emerge. For example, the new digital 
economy may be in the ‘installation phase’ 
rather than the ‘deployment phase’ (van 
Ark, 2016), causing a delay between 
recognition of a technology’s potential and 
its measurable effects (Brynjolfsson, Rock 
and Syverson, 2017). 
Others argue that the diffusion of 
technology across firms has weakened. Skill 
mismatches, competition failures, 
investment constraints and other factors 
may have slowed the diffusion machine 
(OECD, 2015). Another explanation is that 
the 1995–2004 period was an anomaly. 
With the internet, and the reorganisation 
of distribution sectors, etc., many things 
came together at once. This may have been 
a one-time upward shift in the level of 
productivity rather than a permanent 
increase in its growth rate (Byrne, Fernald 
and Reinsdorf, 2016).
This article focuses on mismeasurement 
in the digital economy1 as a possible 
explanation for the slowdown (see, for 
example, Adler et al., 2017). If productivity 
measures are failing to adequately capture 
new and improved digital products, ‘true’ 
productivity growth may be higher than 
measured productivity growth.
Why we care about productivity
Productivity is a measure of the efficiency 
with which inputs (labour, capital and 
raw materials) are converted into outputs 
(goods and services) (Gordon, Zhao 
and Gretton, 2015). The reason we care 
about productivity is that improving 
productivity means that we are making 
more of New Zealand’s limited resources, 
which provides us with more choices. It 
means, for example, that there are more 
goods to consume for the same amount 
of inputs; people can have more leisure 
time while producing the same amount 
of goods; and fewer natural resources are 
required to produce the same amount of 
output (Fox, 2007). 
Over the long term, increasing 
productivity is the only way to sustainably 
increase incomes (Sharpe, 2002). This is 
because the other main source of economic 
growth – growth in inputs – is unsustainable, 
as inputs will become increasingly 
constrained. For example, as the New 
Zealand population ages, the number of 
hours worked by New Zealanders (a 
measure of labour input) will be restricted. 
Productivity growth, on the other hand, is 
not constrained by the size of the 
population or other factors. Productivity 
growth is sustainable through technological 
advances. This is why Paul Krugman (1994) 
famously said: ‘Productivity isn’t 
everything, but in the long run it is almost 
everything.’ 
Productivity is not the only thing that 
matters. Productivity growth on its own 
may do little for inequality or poverty, for 
example (Sharpe, 2002). Productivity 
measures don’t capture the potential or 
contribution of those not in paid 
employment, and so do not indicate the 
efficient allocation or uses of labour from 
a societal perspective. But lifting 
productivity is highly relevant for New 
Zealand. While New Zealand has 
historically been very successful at getting 
people into work, it has had a consistently 
poor productivity performance (Conway 
and Meehan, 2013). Reasons for this poor 
productivity performance include New 
Zealand’s small and insular domestic 
markets, weak international connections, 
capital shallowness, and weak investment 
in knowledge-based capital (Conway, 
2016). This poor performance contributes 
to comparatively low incomes in New 
Zealand.   
Productivity concepts and measurement
Productivity is commonly defined as: ‘a 
ratio of a volume measure of output to a 
volume measure of input’ (OECD, 2001). 
Productivity rises when the volume of 
output increases more rapidly than the 
volume of input, and falls when the volume 
of input increases more rapidly than the 
associated output. 
There are two important points to note 
from this definition. First, productivity is 
about production. Productivity therefore 
generally only covers things that are 
produced and that consumers pay for. 
Second, productivity is a volume measure. 
The volume of output has two components: 
quantity – the number of units (of a good 
or service); and quality – the description 
of the characteristics of each unit (Office 
for National Statistics, 2007). For example, 
a better (higher-quality) pair of shoes can 
be thought of as providing more ‘running 
services’. The same concept applies to 
inputs. For example, higher-skilled (higher-
quality) labour represents a higher volume 
of labour. A key difference, though, is that 
a higher volume of labour reduces 
productivity, as labour is an input, whereas 
a higher volume of output increases 
productivity. 
Measuring productivity involves 
dividing some measure of the volume of 
output by some measure of the volume of 
input. One commonly used measure of 
labour productivity is GDP per hour 
worked.
Prices play a key role in productivity 
measurement. When markets are function-
ing efficiently, the ratio of one market price 
to another reflects the relative appreciation 
of the two products by those who purchase 
them (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009). In 
other words, dimensions of quality prized 
by consumers tend to be reflected in prices. 
A key issue from a productivity measure-
ment perspective is determining whether a 
price rise reflects general inflation or 
improvements in quality. Quality 
improvements represent an increase in 
volume, while general inflation does not. 
The relationship between prices, quality 
and volumes is therefore an ongoing issue 
for measurement. This is challenging in the 
services sector, as services are often 
customised and so it is difficult to 
Productivity measures don’t capture the 
potential or contribution of those not in 
paid employment, and so do not indicate 
the efficient allocation or uses of labour 
from a societal perspective.
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distinguish between quality and price 
changes (Bean, 2016). It is also challenging 
in relation to digital products and services, 
as quality and price changes can move in 
different directions for these products and 
services. For example, the power and 
quality of computers has increased 
tremendously in recent decades, while the 
price has fallen dramatically. 
Figure 1 provides a stylised example of 
how changes in the quantity, quality and 
price of outputs and inputs affect 
productivity. For example, in the second 
row, a lower quantity of labour is used 
compared with the status quo (first row), 
so productivity has increased.
Why we need to understand the digital 
economy
While the digital economy presents 
challenges for productivity measurement, 
it provides opportunities to lift New 
Zealand’s productivity performance – 
through, for example, the adoption of new 
digital technologies. Given New Zealand’s 
distance from major markets, there are 
benefits from a shift to a more ‘weightless’ 
economy based on trading knowledge-
intensive products (Conway, 2017). 
Making the most of new digital 
technologies implies some changes in 
economic structure, which requires smooth 
resource reallocation across industries 
(ibid.). This structural change has a 
number of policy implications, including 
for the labour market, as people need to be 
equipped with new skills in order to adapt 
to change. 
However, Conway (2016) showed that 
technology diffusion and resource 
allocation do not work as well as they could 
in New Zealand. Reasons include that some 
New Zealand firms – particularly ones 
operating in small and insular regional 
markets – do not face much competitive 
pressure. These firms can lack incentives to 
invest in new technologies, and can linger 
as small, unproductive firms, rather than 
either grow or exit the economy. These 
firms can get left behind in the digital age. 
Growth in the digital economy is putting 
pressure on measurement 
A number of studies have tried to 
estimate the effects of the digital economy 
on productivity mismeasurement. As 
discussed later, current estimates suggest 
that mismeasurement of productivity 
arising from the digital economy is likely to 
have played a fairly minor role in explaining 
the global productivity slowdown.
Many of the measurement issues relating 
to the digital economy are not new. For 
example, issues such as consumers receiving 
free media services paid for via advertising 
(e.g., television channels) have been around 
for a long time (Ahmad and Schreyer, 2016). 
But the growth in the digital economy is 
increasing the potential scale of 
mismeasurement. Therefore, what is new is 
the scale of the problem. In addition, there 
is significant uncertainty about the scale of 
the problem. For example, the composition 
of IT investment has shifted toward 
components – such as software – for which 
measurement is more uncertain (Byrne, 
Fernald and Reinsdorf, 2016).
An important point to note is that some 
of the measurement concerns conceptually 
fall outside GDP. Many aspects of the 
digital economy, such as consumers’ 
involvement in the production process, 
have not conventionally been included in 
GDP (and thus productivity measures). 
GDP is only concerned with market 
production, so generally only products and 
services that consumers pay for are 
currently included. GDP does not include 
the consumer surplus (or unpaid-for 
benefits) from digital products.
Table 1 provides more details on some 
of these issues. Note that digital products 
such as computers and other IT products 
appear on both the output and the input 
side of the productivity ratio. This means 
that, for multifactor productivity, 
mismeasurement of IT products has 
offsetting effects. While much of the table 
relates to digital products as outputs, many 
of the same issues apply to digital products 
as inputs.
Mismeasurement is unlikely to explain the 
productivity slowdown   
A number of studies have estimated the 
role of mismeasurement in the global 
productivity slowdown. Many of these 
studies have focused on the United 
States (see, for example, Syverson, 2016; 
Byrne, Fernald and Reinsdorf, 2016), 
but some have considered productivity 
mismeasurement in other OECD countries 
(see, for example, Ahmad and Schreyer, 
2016; Ahmad, Ribarsky and Reinsdorf, 
Figure 1: Productivity is about converting inputs into outputs
Current situation
Quantity of inputs (labour) goes down
Quantity of outputs (telephones) goes up
Price of outputs (telephones) goes down
Quality of inputs (labour) goes up
Quality of outputs (mobile phones) goes up
INPUTS OUTPUTS PRODUCTIVITY
CHANGE
NO CHANGE
$2
00
$2
00
$2
00
$2
00
$2
00
$2
00
$2
00
$1
00
$1
00
$2
00
$2
00
$2
00
$2
00
Source: Author
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2017). These studies have used different 
methodologies and data, but their findings 
are reasonably consistent (Brynjolfsson, 
Rock and Syverson, 2017). The consensus 
appears to be that, while mismeasurement 
can explain some of the slowdown, it 
probably accounts for only a relatively 
small proportion (Manyika et al., 2017). 
This implies that the slowdown is a real 
effect rather than illusory. 
Measuring a measurement problem is 
challenging. Estimates of productivity 
mismeasurement vary markedly, and there 
is considerable uncertainty around the 
estimates. For example, one US study 
(Syverson, 2016) reviewed estimates of the 
unpaid-for gains to consumers from 
internet access. The author calculated that 
the lowest of these estimates accounts for 
a tiny fraction of the productivity 
slowdown, while the largest accounts for 
up to one-third of the slowdown. 
One highly cited study (Byrne, Fernald 
and Reinsdorf, 2016) found little evidence 
that the productivity slowdown in the US 
arises from growing mismeasurement of 
the gains from innovation in IT-related 
goods and services. The authors gave three 
main reasons:
· Mismeasurement of IT hardware was 
already significant before the slowdown. 
Because the production of these 
products has fallen, the effect on 
productivity was larger in the 1995–
2004 period than since. Also, IT 
mismeasurement affects GDP and 
labour productivity more that 
multifactor productivity (as IT appears 
as both an input and an output in 
Table 1: Challenges for productivity measurement arising from the digital economy
Issue Examples Estimates of scale of effect Potential remedies
Prices and quality – new and improved 
digital technologies may not be fully 
identified, thus under-stating output volume 
growth in GDP (so productivity may be 
under-stated). 
Assets such as ICT may be under-stated in 
the capital stock (an input), so MFP may be 
over-stated
· ICT equipment such as 
computers
· Software
· Communications services
· Many other digital  products
· Estimates range from around 
0.2 to 0.7 percentage points 
pa of GDP growth across 
countries
· Substantial variation in 
countries’ treatment of ICT 
price movements
· Effect on MFP somewhat 
offset by ICT being an input 
as well as an output
· Improve price and quality 
adjustment methods 
Free and subsidised consumer goods – free 
digital products are not included in GDP (so 
productivity may be under-stated), although 
consumers do pay for them to some extent 
via advertising and firms’ use of consumer 
data  
· Free apps for smartphones
· Facebook
· Google
· Skype
· Imputing values for free 
media products  has a 
minimal impact on GDP 
levels (at most 0.1% pa of 
GDP), with negligible impacts 
on GDP growth rates                                     
· Improve price and quality 
adjustment methods 
· Supplement with other 
measures
Free assets produced by households – free 
‘public goods’ which use volunteer labour 
are not captured in GDP (so productivity 
may be under-stated)
· Wikipedia
· Linux
· Wikipedia – up to 0.1% pa of 
global GDP if a fee were 
charged  
· Exclude from GDP, as 
conventionally volunteers’ 
services are valued at zero
· Supplement with other 
measures
Peer-to-peer services – consumer-to-
consumer transactions facilitated by digital 
technologies are not fully captured in GDP 
(so productivity may be under-stated). 
Assets such as vehicles are not fully 
captured in the capital stock (so MFP may 
be over-stated)
· UberPop
· AirBnB
· E-Bay
· Uber – effect of including 
vehicles in capital stock is 
very small
· Use tax administrative data to 
better capture output and 
inputs
Consumers as producers – households’ 
involvement in the production process is not 
captured in GDP (so productivity may be 
under-stated)
· On-line travel booking
· Self-check at airports
· Self-service in supermarkets
· Not known but growing · Exclude from GDP, as 
conventionally services 
provided by households for 
their own consumption are 
excluded 
Cross-border trade – some production is 
recorded in the (low-tax) country in which 
it is registered, rather than the country of 
economic ownership (so productivity may be 
under-stated); this also affects the capital 
stock (so MFP may be over-stated)
· IP products e.g. R&D and 
computer software and 
databases
· Knowledge  assets e.g. 
human and organisational 
capital
· Knowledge assets not 
included in GDP are typically 
larger than those that are
· Despite this, it is estimated 
that incorporating intangibles 
makes little difference
· Reallocate income flows to 
the country of the parent 
company (so use Gross 
National Income rather than 
GDP)
· Carefully interpret cross-
country comparisons
Source: drawn from Ahmad and Schreyer, 2016; Ahmad, Ribarsky and Reinsdorf, 2017
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multifactor productivity, which has 
offsetting effects). 
· Many of the consumer benefits from 
smartphones, Google searches and 
Facebook are, conceptually, non-
market, and so fall outside the market 
production measured by GDP. 
· Other measurement issues that the 
authors did quantify are quantitatively 
small relative to the slowdown. 
Figure 2 shows that the effect of 
adjusting US labour productivity growth 
for some of these factors is reasonably 
modest. The largest contributing factor to 
the adjustment is computer and 
communication equipment price deflators, 
reflecting the challenges of price and 
quality adjustments discussed above.  
Overall, these authors’ estimates would 
add only about 0.3 percentage points to 
GDP growth per year for the US economy. 
This is small relative to the 1.8 percentage 
points slowdown in labour productivity 
growth per year over 2004–14 compared 
to the preceding decade.
It is hard to know how New Zealand 
compares
It is difficult to be sure how New Zealand 
compares to other countries in terms of 
potential productivity mismeasurement, 
as New Zealand has not featured in recent 
studies that have directly compared countries. 
Some indirect factors tend to suggest New 
Zealand could compare favourably, and 
other indirect factors do not. 
In relation to general measurement 
issues, Statistics New Zealand follows best 
practice guidelines for productivity 
measurement, such as those from the 
OECD (see OECD, 2001), and continually 
refines its productivity measures. New 
Zealand is reasonably well placed in 
relation to some measurement concerns. 
For example, New Zealand has relatively 
good data on ride-sharing companies due 
to the use of tax administrative data in 
productivity measurement, and to the ride-
sharing market being subject to regulation.
Some insights may be gained from 
considering the relative importance of the 
digital economy to New Zealand compared 
with other countries. If the digital economy 
features comparatively strongly in New 
Zealand, then it seems plausible that the 
associated measurement challenges are 
prominent too. 
Assessing the importance of the digital 
economy is not an easy task, as there are 
numerous definitional issues (see OECD, 
2017a). However, the OECD’s most recent 
digital economy outlook report (OECD, 
2017b) suggests that New Zealand is a 
comparatively digital nation. New Zealand 
appeared in the top half of OECD rankings 
for many of the measures included in the 
report, such as the proportion of tertiary 
graduates in ICT, the proportion of 
employees in the ICT sector, and the 
penetration of fixed broadband in the 
population. In particular, New Zealand 
devoted the largest share of 
telecommunications revenue to 
telecommunication investment, reflecting 
the roll-out of broadband. The significance 
of the digital economy to New Zealand 
tentatively suggests that the associated 
productivity measurement challenges may 
be comparatively significant too. 
Other insights may be gained from 
considering the extent of mismeasurement 
in countries similar to New Zealand. One 
such country is Australia, which arguably 
has some characteristics similar to New 
Zealand, such as distance from major 
markets. Australia is included in some 
comparative studies about distinguishing 
between price and quality changes – a 
factor that is assessed as quantitatively the 
largest contributor to productivity 
mismeasurement. For example, Ahmad, 
Ribarsky and Reinsdorf (2017) estimated 
productivity mismeasurement due to 
inadequate price and quality adjustment 
of digital products in a number of OECD 
countries, including Australia. The implied 
adjustments to GDP growth were lower in 
Australia (0.02 percentage points per year) 
compared with most of the countries 
included in the analysis (around 0.2 
percentage points per year), which appears 
to largely reflect patterns of ICT output and 
investment in the Australian economy. 
Assuming that ICT price adjustment 
methods, and the composition of ICT, in 
Australia and New Zealand are similar, this 
tentatively implies that the scale of this 
source of potential mismeasurement may 
be small in New Zealand compared with 
other OECD countries.  
Conclusions and policy implications
Robert Solow’s comment that the computer 
age can be seen everywhere but in the 
productivity statistics seems as relevant 
today as when the comment was made 30 
years ago. Growth in the digital economy 
creates opportunities and challenges for 
productivity and its measurement.
The adoption of new digital 
technologies provides an opportunity for 
New Zealand to lift our productivity 
performance. From a policy perspective, 
the key issue is how best to capitalise on 
this opportunity, and how to ensure a 
smooth transition path.
The digital economy has many benefits 
to New Zealanders that fall outside 
conventional productivity measurement. 
The key issue here is how best to measure 
these benefits. Statistics New Zealand and 
the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Figure 2:  Accounting for mismeasurement doesn’t add much
Official and adjusted labour productivity growth in the US (annual average percent)
Sources:  Adler et al., 2017, using data drawn from Byrne, Fernald and Reinsdorf, 2016
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Employment are currently developing a 
Digital Nation Domain Plan, which should 
provide an opportunity to do this. This 
domain plan identifies enduring questions 
about New Zealand’s digital transformation, 
and any gaps in the data that need to be 
filled to address these questions. The 
enduring questions include some about the 
impact of New Zealanders’ engagement in 
digital technologies (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2018), and so potentially could 
cover the unpaid-for benefits from digital 
products. 
The digital economy creates challenges 
for productivity measurement. Mis-
measurement is estimated to have played a 
fairly minor role in the global productivity 
slowdown. However, mismeasurement is 
likely to be growing. This means that 
productivity growth rates need to be 
interpreted with care, and that our ability 
to analyse productivity trends over time is 
hampered. Stable mismeasurement of 
productivity levels would be less of a worry. 
It is important to continually improve 
the measurement of productivity. 
Improving methods for making 
adjustments for price and quality changes 
to outputs (and inputs) appears to be 
particularly important. Developments that 
Statistics New Zealand has planned or 
underway include the greater use of 
transaction or scanner data, administrative 
data and web-scraped data in measuring 
price and quality changes (Bentley and 
Krsinich, 2017). These types of data are 
valuable for their richness and timeliness, 
and – compared with surveys – reduced 
respondent burden. 
The digital economy is therefore itself 
part of the measurement solution. The use 
of administrative and other ‘big’ data 
provides opportunities to capture new 
types of transactions (ibid.). One example 
is to use big data to transform hedonic or 
regression-based methods (ibid.). Hedonic 
price adjustment essentially ‘unbundles’ the 
contribution to prices of different 
characteristics of a product. 
Overall, productivity measures play a 
unique role in our understanding of the 
economy: they tell us about how efficiently 
New Zealand’s resources are being used. 
Despite the challenges the digital economy 
poses for measurement, for the most part 
productivity measures still appear to 
capture ‘true’ productivity, and to broadly 
reflect the underlying concepts they are 
targeting.
1 ‘Digital economy’ means an economy that is based on digital 
computing technologies.
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